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The Court has requested special briefing on the issue of
the impact of this Court's decision in LMV Leasing. Inc. v. Conlin.
805 P.2d 189 (Utah App. 1991) on this case vis-a-vis the decision
of the Supreme Court of Utah in Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larsen
Bros. Const. , 731 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986) , regarding the issue of
lease versus security agreement.

|

The Court has also requested that Appellants respond to
the offer of compromise made by Appellee Overland in oral argument
regarding crediting Appellants with one half of the $51,864.90
total from the Trustee's Sale of Appellants' property. In response
to the offer of compromise made at this late stage, for the reasons
stated herein, Appellants hereby reject said offer•
Addressing

the

applicability

of

Conlin,

Appellants

contend here, as expressed in their reply brief, that it makes no
difference whether the lease agreement is construed as a lease or
security agreement because Appellee is bound for its recovery on
I

the contractual provision for liquidated damages which reasonably
interpreted and construed, establishes a penalty and will not be
enforced under familiar rules that are uniformly applied in such
circumstances.

,

The affidavit submitted by Appellee Overland to establish
damages, although nicely drawn, was not in conformity with the
liquidated damages provision of the lease agreement and was
therefore legally inadequate where Appellants did not offer any
affidavits in opposition, assuming that Appellee Overland is bound
by the contractual provisions of the agreement between the parties.
In Conlin, 805 P.2d at 196, this Court specified those

factors it considers significant.

First, the Court stated, "'The

prime essential distinction between a lease and a conditional sale
is that in a lease the lessee never owns the property.1"

That is

not the case here in light of the option to purchase contained in
the lease agreement. In Conlin, the lease contained no such option
to purchase.

Second, this Court stated in Conlin that "[t]he

agreement specifically provides for retention of title [in the
lessor] ..."

Id.

In the instant action, the lease contains an

option to purchase "which is an alternative provision for transfer
of ownership."

Id.

This Court then added that "ownership tax

benefits under the lease agreement, another traditional indication*
that the parties intended to enter into a true lease agreement"
were reserved exclusively to the lessor in Conlin.

Id.

In this

action, ownership tax benefits, as indicated by the record, were
in favor of the lessee, the Appellants.
Factors such as the option to purchase and the ownership
tax benefits, in addition to the numerous factors listed in
Colonial Leasing Co. , 731 P.2d at 487, which are present in this
lease and were enumerated during oral argument, indicate genuine
issues of material fact which preclude the entry of summary
judgment.
In Colonial Leasing Co., the lower court held that parol
evidence was not admissible to change the character of the lease
agreement.

It is Appellants' understanding of the holding of the

Utah Supreme Court in Colonial Leasing Co. that the presence of
certain provisions

in the putative lease agreement that are

commonly associated with and contained in purchase agreements

create ambiguities and the necessity for the admission of extrinsic
or parol evidence to clear up. The case was remanded so the trial
court could allow parol evidence to clear up the ambiguity that was
created by the presence of provisions that are normally associated
with purchase agreements.

See, Colonial Leasing Co., 731 P.2d at

488.
In the instant action, there is only one conclusion
reasonably inferable from the provisions of the documents (the
lease agreement and the trust deed), i.e., the transaction is a
sale agreement.

If, as Appellee Overland contends, the agreement

is a true lease, then why the requirement for additional security
in the form of the trust deed on Appellants1 residence.

The

security in the form of the trust deed, along with the equipment
described in the lease, are labeled as "security" for payment of
the installment payments described in the lease.
But then, as previously stated, whether the character of
the transaction is determined to be a lease or a sale, the Appellee
Overland cannot recover under the liquidated damages provision
because that would be a penalty.
For the foregoing reasons, summary judgment is not
appropriate in this case, and this Court should reverse the lower
court's granting of summary judgment.
DATED this 27th day of June, 1991.
J. H. BOTTUM & ASSOCIATES

David W. Brown
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

VIVIAN M. SCHELLER and
STEVEN D. TOLLSTRUP,

t

Plaintiffs,

]
)
)

vs.

i
\

DIXIE SIX CORPORATION,
Defendant.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Civil No. 830906862CV
JUDGE LEONARD H. RUSSON

;

This matter came on for trial on the 21st day of November,
1989, at the hour of 10:00 o'clock a.m.

The plaintiffs, Scheller

and Tollstrup, were represented by Walter P. Faber, Jr. and
Richard M. Matheson. Dixie Six was represented by Craig G.
Adamson and John T. Evans.

i

This matter was remanded to this court by the Utah Court of
Appeals for the sole purpose of determining the value of the nonsale efforts of Dixie Six, the general partner, to Scheller and
Tollstrup, the limited partners, under a theory of quantum meruit
outlined by the Court of Appeals in its decision.

The court

having reviewed the file, the decision of the Court of Appeals,
the evidence submitted and the argument advanced by each of the
parties at the trial after remand and being fully informed in the
matter, and good cause appearing therefor, now makes and enters
the following:
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Both Dixie Six and Scheller and TollstrUP presented

evidence as to the value of the uotv-sale efforts, of Dixie Siv:^
2.

Scheller and Tollstrup's experts testified that the

efforts of Dixie Six did not enhance the value of the property,
since the purchaser, Busch Development Company# modified the
plans and obtained a new conditional use permit and did not
utilize the efforts made by Dixie Six.

One of scheller and

Tollstrup's experts testified that reasonable effort to obtain a
conditional use permit at the time in question would have
required 40 hours of time at $75 per hour.
2.

Dixie Six presented evidence through it£ general manager

that he spent 10% to 20% of his time over a two and one half year
period on the project in question.

Dixie Six presented no

evidence as to the hourly value of such time*
3.

The court finds that the manager of Dixie Six spent 15%

of his time during the two and one-half years from 1980 through
1982 in non-sale efforts and that such efforts have a reasonable
value of $36,000.00.
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact# th£ court now makes
and enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court of Appeals remanded to this court the sole

question whether Dixie Six was entitled to any compensation in
quantum meruit for the value# if any, of its non-^sale efforts.
2.

Accordingly, the court concludes that the reasonable
2
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value of Dixie Six/s non-sale efforts in quantum meruit is
$36,000.00 and determines that Dixie Six should be awarded that
amount and that Scheller and Tollstrup should receive the balance
of the sale proceeds plus interest thereon in accordance with the
Court of Appeals decision.
DATED this

day of March, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

LEONARD H. RUSSON, District Judge
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 2 ^

day of March, 1990, I

caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be delivered
to Craig G. Adamson and Eric P. Lee, attorneys for defendant,
310 South Main, Suite 1330, Salt Lake City, UT.
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WALTER P. FABER, JR. (A1026)
Attorney for Plaintiffs
2102 East 3300 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84109
Telephone: 486-5634
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
VIVIAN M. SCHELLER and
STEVEN D. TOLLSTRUP,
JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,

Civil No. 830906862CV

vs.

JUDGE LEONARD H. RUSSON

DIXIE SIX CORPORATION,
Defendant.

This matter came on for trial on the 21st day of November,
1989, at the hour of 10:00 o'clock a.m.

The plaintiffs were

represented by Walter P. Faber, Jr. and Richard M. Matheson.
Defendant was represented by Craig G. Adamson and John T. Evans.
This matter was remanded to this court by the Utah Court of
Appeals for the sole purpose of determining the value of the nonsale efforts of the defendant, Dixie Six, the general partner, to
the plaintiffs, Scheller and Tollstrup, the limited partners,
under a theory of quantum meruit outlined by the Court of Appeals
n its decision.

The court having reviewed the file, the

decision of the Court of Appeals, the evidence submitted and the
argument advanced by each of the parties at the trial after
remand and having entered its findings and conclusions of law and
being fully informed in the matter, and good cause appearing
therefor, it is hereby
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ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that
Dixie Six be awarded the sum of $36,000,00 for its non-sale
efforts and that Scheller and Tollstrup receive the balance of
the sale proceeds plus interest thereon in accordance with the
Court of Appeals decision.

DATED this

/ /

en
c&4U.
day of 45arch, 1990.
BY THE COURT

fismmd

H. RUSSON.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the_£?T_May of March, 1990, I
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be delivered
to Craig G. Adamson and Eric P. Lee, attorneys for defendant,
310 South Main, Suite 1330, Salt Lake City, UT.
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Cite as 753 P-2d 971 (UtahApp. 1988)

gom Corp., 618 P.2d at 505. "[I]t cannot
be adopted as a general precept of contract
law that, whenever one party to a contract
can show injury flowing from the exercise
of a contract right by the other, a basis for
relief will be somehow devised by the
courts." Mann, 586 P.2d at 464.
The judgment below is reversed. The
parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
GREENWOOD and ORME, JJ.,
concur.
(O

|«YNUMMI5YST£M>

Vivian M. SCHELLER and Steven D.
Tollstrup, Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
DIXIE SIX CORPORATION, Defendant
and Respondent
No. 860147-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
April 25, 1988.
Limited partners in real estate limited
partnership filed suit seeking declaratory
judgment limiting general partner to recovery of its expenses plus 6% sales commission for sale of undeveloped partnership
property. The Third District Court, Salt
Lake County, Dean E. Conder, J., concluded that limited partners were estopped
from claiming that general partner had not
performed in accordance with partnership
agreement, and limited partners appealed.
The Court of Appeals, Orme, J., held that:
(1) limited partners were not estopped by
their actions from asserting that general
partner did not perform as provided under
agreement; (2) "develop" within meaning
of partnership agreement meant build, and
agreement did not contemplate sale of
property without development; and (3) parties' conduct established contract implied in

fact as to allocation of proceeds if property
was sold prior to development, and general
partner was entitled to recovery in quantum meruit for reasonable value of its nonsale efforts.
Affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part.

1. Partnership e»366
Limited partners in real estate limited
partnership, who contended that general
partner's right to share equally in profits
from sale of property was only triggered if
the property was developed, were not estopped from contesting general partner's
entitlement to profits upon sale of undeveloped property by virtue of their previous
agreement to two minor sales of undeveloped property and to proposed sale which
never took place.
2. Partnership <3=»366
"Develop," within meaning of real estate limited partnership agreement that
provided that purpose of partnership was
to develop property, meant build, and division of profits upon sale of property before
any building had taken place could not be
determined by reference to agreement.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
3. Partnership e»366
Conduct of parties to real estate limited partnership agreement that provided
that purpose of partnership was to develop
property established contract implied in
fact as to allocation of proceeds if property
was sold prior to development, and general
partner was entitled to recovery in quantum meruit for reasonable value of its nonsale efforts; limited partners requested
general partner to perform work of developing property and general partner clearly
expected to be compensated for such services, and limited partners knew or should
have known that general partner expected
compensation beyond sales commission it
would receive for just selling property.

A-7
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Walter P. Faber, Jr., Watkins & Faber,
Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and appellants.
Craig G. Adamson (argued), Mark A.
Larsen, Lawrence K. Hurless, Dart, Adamson, and Parken, Salt Lake City, for defendant and respondent.
Before BILLINGS, GARFF, and
ORME, JJ.
OPINION
ORME, Judge:
Appellants Scheller and Tollstrup appeal
from a judgment awarding defendant Dixie
Six Corporation what they contend is an
excessive distribution pursuant to a limited
partnership agreement between the parties. We reverse in part and remand.
Facts
Vivian Scheller and her son Steven
Tollstrup ("Scheller"), owned approximately twenty-four acres of property in Salt
Lake County which they intended to have
developed to produce long-term income. In
the spring of 1979, Mrs. Scheller approached Hal Larsen, an officer of Dixie
Six Corporation, about working with her
and her son to develop the property. On
March 3, 1980, the parties formed a limited
partnership known as D.S.T., Ltd., with
Dixie Six as the general partner and Mrs.
Scheller and her son as limited partners.
Pursuant to the limited partnership agreement, Dixie Six contributed $10,000 toward
the initial capital and Scheller conveyed the
property to D.S.T.
The partnership agreement provided that
the purpose of the partnership was to "subdivide, develop and market" the property.
The words "subdivide, develop and market"
were left undefined. The agreement contained a formula for the allocation of the
partnership's receipts, which may be summarized as follows:
(a) First, to reimburse the actual expenses relative to the subdividing, de1. Articles IV and XIV of the agreement required
Dixie Six, as one of its obligations, to obtain

velopment, improvement and sale of
the property,
(b) Second, to payment to the Limited
Partners for the real property, calculated at $30,000 per acre.
(c) Third, one-half of the remainder to
Dixie Six and one-half of the remainder to the Limited Partners.
In addition, the agreement provided that
Dixie Six could charge the partnership a
real estate commission not exceeding 6% of
the sales price of the property and, further,
that Dixie Six had the unqualified right to
sell the property at any time.
Following the signing of the agreement,
Dixie Six hired Western Design, which began preparing plans, plats, and studies, and
sought governmental approval to build an
apartment and commercial complex on the
site.
In April 1981, D.S.T. sold 1.2 acres of the
property to Marvin Hendrickson, an officer
and shareholder in Dixie Six, for $36,000.00
and in February 1982, D.S.T. sold an additional 0.75 acres to Hendrickson. In both
transactions, D.S.T. took no sales commission or other distribution and paid all of the
proceeds to Scheller.
Once the plans for improvement on the
site were completed in the fall of 1982,
Dixie Six attempted to get financing for
the project but was unsuccessful.1 During
this time, D.S.T. received an offer from
P.F. West to purchase the remaining prop
erty. Dixie Six sought Scheller's consent
to the proposed sale to P.F. Wesi and
Scheller consented, but the sale was never
completed. Dixie Six subsequently discontinued its efforts to locate and obtain financing. Dixie Six then caused the remaining partnership property to be sold to
Busch Development on June 30, 1983. for a
sum in excess of $1.2 million.
Prior to the sale of the property. Dixie
Six informed Scheller that it intended to
divide the proceeds from the sale according
to the formula set forth in the partnership
financing.

,-8
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Cite at 753 P2d S

agreement2 Scheller objected to allocation
of the proceeds on that basis. The sale
was concluded without the allocation issue
having been resolved. On September 23,
1983 Scheller filed suit in district court
seeking a declaratory judgment limiting
Dixie Six to the recovery of its expenses
plus the 6% sales commission for the sale
of the property and to prohibit Dixie Six
from sharing in the profit of the sale as set
forth in the partnership agreement.
The trial court found that the partnership agreement did not define the words
"subdivide, develop, and market" and concluded that Dixie Six did not violate the
agreement by selling the property. The
court also concluded that Scheller was estopped from claiming that Dixie Six had
not performed in accordance with the contract because Scheller had knowledge of,
and in fact acquiesced and approved of, all
sales of the property. In addition, the
court found that it would be inequitable to
allow Scheller to accept the efforts of Dixie
Six without allowing Dixie Six to recover as
provided in the contract. Since the parties
had expressly provided no alternative method of compensating Dixie Six for its services, the court found the formula as set forth
in the partnership agreement to be enforceable.
Scheller argues that Dixie Six was not
entitled to a full share of the profits from
the sale of the property because it sold the
property without "developing" it as required by the agreement. Scheller acknowledges that, while Dixie Six had the
unqualified right to sell the property at any
time, a right Scheller contends was given
primarily for tax purposes, it had the obligation to "subdivide, develop and market"
the property. Thus, Dixie Six's right to
share in the proceeds according to the formula set forth in the agreement was contingent upon its fulfilling its obligation to
"subdivide, develop and market" the property.
The trial court did not reach the issue of
the meaning of the term "develop" as used
2. In their complaint, Scheller also claimed that
Dixie Six had demanded a commission of 19%
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in the agreement because it determined
that Scheller was "estopped" from taking
the position that Dixie Six had not performed as provided in the contract. We
find Scheller's conduct does not constitute
estoppel.

Estoppel
[1] The elements of estoppel are: "conduct by one party which leads another party, in reliance thereon, to adopt a course of
action resulting in detriment or damage if
the first party is permitted to repudiate his
conduct" Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d 1226,
1230, (Utah CtApp. 1988) (quoting Blackhurst v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 699 P.2d
688, 691 (Utah 1985)). The trial court concluded that appellants were estopped from
asserting that Dixie Six could not sell the
property unless it was "developed" because
Scheller had knowledge of, acquiesced in,
and approved of the two minor sales of
property to Marvin Hendrickson and the
proposed sale to P.F. West, all without any
development having taken place. However,
the trial court's conclusion confuses Scheller's position concerning sale of the property with Scheller's position concerning the
allocation of proceeds upon sale.
Scheller has not asserted that Dixie Six
could not sell the property unless it was
"developed" as anticipated under the
agreement but only that Dixie Six was not
entitled to a full share of the proceeds for
the sale of property unless it satisfied its
obligations under the contract Scheller's
approval of the first two sales of property
do not constitute an estoppel from objecting to the allocation of proceeds from the
Busch sale for two reasons. First the
earlier sales of property, combined, constituted only 1.95 acres out of the total 24
acres owned by D.S.T. and involved land
that was never intended for development
Second, Dixie Six took no sales commissions on these transactions and paid all the
proceeds to Scheller. Therefore, Scheller
rather than the 6% provided in the agreement.
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had no reason to complain about the allocation of proceeds.
Nor can Scheller's approval of the proposed P.F. West sale form the basis of an
estoppel from objecting to the allocation of
proceeds from the Busch sale. The P.F.
West sale was never completed and there
were no proceeds to allocate. Thus, Scheller's failure to object to the allocation of
proceeds from two sales in which Dixie Six
took no proceeds and one proposed sale
which never reached the point of allocation,
is not conduct that could reasonably lead
Dixie Six to believe that Scheller would not
object to its claiming a full share of proceeds in the event of a consummated sale
of undeveloped property. Any uncertainty
in this regard was resolved when, nearly
two months prior to closing of the Busch
sale, Scheller's counsel wrote Dixie Six objecting to use of the agreement's formula
for allocating sale proceeds if the property
were sold undeveloped.

often: one that improves and subdivides
land and builds and sells residential structures thereon." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 618 (1986).
The parties' agreement states in Article
II that the purpose of the partnership is to
"subdivide, develop, and market" the property. The use of these terms, or some
variation, throughout the agreement, is
consistent with the interpretation that "develop" means to build. For example, Article VI, with our emphasis, states as follows:
In addition thereto, Dixie shall contribute
its expertise for the purpose of subdividing, developing and marketing the property; shall provide or obtain all equipment, machinery and personnel necessary for such subdivision, development
and marketing; and shall obtain the necessary and sufficient financing for such
subdivision, development and marketing,
using the property as security thereof.

We hold that the trial court erred in
concluding that Scheller was estopped by
its own actions from asserting that Dixie
Six did not perform as provided in the
contract Because the trial court decided
the case on a theory of estoppel, it was not
necessary for it to reach what we view as
the pivotal issue in this case, namely the
meaning of the term "develop" as used in
the agreement. Since we find that Scheller's conduct did not give rise to an estoppel, the exact meaning of the term is critical.
"Subdivide, Develop and Market"
[2] Generally, the term "develop,"
when used in connection with real estate, is
interpreted to mean "the converting of a
tract of land into an area suitable for residential or business uses." Prince George's
County v. Equitable Trust Co., Inc., 44
Md.App. 272, 408 A.2d 737, 742 (1979). Accord, Muirkead v. Pilot Properties, Inc.,
258 So.2d 232, 233 (Miss.1972). Similarly,
the word "developer," in common parlance,
means "a person who develops real estate;

Viewing the contract as a whole, we
would have little difficulty in concluding, as
a matter of law, that the term "develop" as
used in this agreement means "build."3
Equipment, machinery, and secured lending suggest construction, not die mere
planning, surveying, studying, and appraising which Dixie Six contends satisfied the
obligation to "develop" the property.
However, even if there is some ambiguity
concerning what the parties intended when
using the term "develop," the evidence
compels the conclusion that the parties intended to mean "build." The formula allocating a full 50% of the net proceeds to
Dixie Six is itself indicative of that result.
If all Scheller anticipated was the sale of
the property, it would have hired a real
estate agent and paid the standard real
estate commission. Common sense dictates that one does not offer soir.eone half
of the net profit on the sale of property for
simply serving as an agent to sell propertyMore importantly, the prior discussions
and negotiations between the parties and
their course of conduct assumed actual

3. Assuming that "develop" means "build/' uncertainty remains as to what was to be built: a
church, a race track, homes, a laundromat, or

even roadways, curbs, and gutters? Such uncc
tainty is inconsequential in adjudicating il'*" Pa
ties' rights where nothing whatever was bui
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building on the property. The trial court
found that Dixie Six sought government
approval for "the building of an apartment
and commercial complex on the site." The
court also found that prior to forming the
partnership, the parties met on the site of
the property and "discussed possible types
and configurations of buildings which
might fit on the land."
The parties' agreement contemplated the
development of the property and did not
anticipate the sale of the property undeveloped. Accordingly, the payment formula
was premised on the sale of developed
property. So certain were the parties that
the property would be developed that they
never contemplated a formula for the allocation of proceeds in the event of a sale of
undeveloped property. Thus, there was
simply no agreement between the parties
as to the allocation of proceeds in the event
that Dixie Six failed to develop the property as required by the agreement
Absent a meeting of the minds on how to
divide the proceeds in the event of sale
without development, Dixie Six has no
clear contractual right to recover anything
in excess of the agreed commission and
expense reimbursement.
Nonetheless,
Scheller concedes that Dixie Six may be
entitled to some sort of equitable remedy.
Quantum Meruit
The trial court, considering it had no
alternative method of compensation, determined it had to either award Dixie Six no
additional compensation whatsoever or a
full 50% of the profit from the sale of the
property. It chose the latter rather than
leave Dixie Six uncompensated for its efforts. While we agree with the trial court
that it would be unfair to allow Scheller to
profit from the work done by Dixie Six in
anticipation of development, we do not
agree that the only alternative is to give
Dixie Six a 50% share of the net proceeds
from the sale.
When a party, for some reason, is not
entitled by the express terms of a contract
to recover payment for services rendered,
he or she might nonetheless be entitled to
recover in quantum meruit. Davies v. 01-
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son, 746 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah Ct.App.1987).
Recovery under quantum meruit presupposes that no enforceable contract exists.
Id. In this case, while the parties entered
into a contract, no contract existed as to
the allocation of proceeds in the event the
property was sold undeveloped.
Quantum meruit has two distinct branches, both rooted in justice to prevent one
party's enrichment at the other's expense.
Id. at 269. The first branch, contract implied in law or "quasi-contract," is really
not a contract at all, but rather an action in
restitution. Id. "The elements of a quasicontract, or a contract implied in law are:
(1) the defendant received a benefit; (2) an
appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of the benefit; (3) under circumstances
that would make it unjust for the defendant to retain the benefit without paying for
it." Id. Recovery under quasi-contract or
contract implied in law is measured by the
value of the benefit conferred on the defendant and not by the detriment incurred
by the plaintiff or, necessarily, the reasonable value of the plaintiffs services. Id.
The second branch of quantum meruit,
contract implied in fact, is an actual contract established by conduct. Id. The elements of a contract implied in fact are: (1)
the defendant requested the plaintiff to
perform the work; (2) the plaintiff expected the defendant to compensate him or her
for those services; and (3) the defendant
knew or should have known that the plaintiff expected compensation. Id. Recovery
in such cases is for the amount the parties
can be said to have reasonably intended as
the contract price. When the parties have
left that amount unexpressed, courts will
infer the amount to be the reasonable value
of the plaintiffs services. Id.
[3] The conduct of the parties in this
case established a contract implied in fact
as to the allocation of proceeds if the property was sold prior to development. Scheller requested Dixie Six to perform the
work of developing the property which necessarily involved the work of preparing
plans, plats, and studies and securing governmental approval for construction on the
site. Likewise, Dixie Six clearly expected
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to be compensated for these services. Finally, Scheller knew or should have known
that Dixie Six expected compensation for
these services beyond the 6% sales commission it would receive for just selling the
property.
It is reasonably clear that, in agreeing to
the payment formula prescribed in the
agreement, the parties contemplated that
Dixie Six's 6% commission, a standard commission rate in the real estate industry,
would compensate it for its efforts in marketing the property while the 50% share in
the net profits would reward it for its efforts in subdividing and developing the
property. Thus, if there had been a mere
sale, 6% of the selling price would represent an appropriate allocation to Dixie Six.
However, while it cannot be said that Dixie
Six satisfied its obligation to develop the
property, the trial court nonetheless found
that Dixie Six had expended efforts which
enhanced the property, including acquiring
plans for development of the property and
obtaining governmental approval for development in accordance with the plans. As
explained above, Dixie Six is entitled to a
recovery in quantum meruit for the reasonable value of its non-sale efforts.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment insofar as it awards Dixie Six the reimbursement of its expenses and a sale commission
of 6%. The judgment is reversed insofar
as it also allowed Dixie Six 50% of the net
sale profits, with remand for a determination of the amount of additional compensation to which Dixie Six is entitled under a
theory of quantum meruit The parties
shall bear their own costs of appeal.
BILLINGS and GARFF, JJ., concur.

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
Appellant,
v.
Curtis OWENS, Defendant and
Respondent
No. 870342-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
April 29,1988.

Defendant was convicted in the Fourth
District Court, George E. Ballif, J., of theft
of rented property, but the court granted
new trial. The State appealed. The Court
of Appeals, Jackson, J., held that State
could not appeal order granting new trial.
Appeal dismissed.

1. Criminal Law <£»905
Motion for new trial generally is permitted for correcting errors made in trial
court, or for reviewing conviction obtained
by unfair or unlawful methods.
2. Criminal Law <S=»919(1)
Witness intimidation by prosecutor can
warrant new trial if it resulted in denial of
defendant's right to fair trial. U.C.A.1953,
77-35-24(a).
3. Criminal Law <s=»1024(7)
In granting a new trial, trial court did
not, in substance, grant arrest of judgment, but looked beyond record to prosecutor's and witness' affidavits and found improper prosecutorial behavior warranting
new trial, and State could not appeal from
such order. U.C.A.1953, 77-35-26.

David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., David B.
Thompson, Asst Atty. Gen., Salt Lake
City, for the State.
Before JACKSON, BENCH and
BILLINGS, JJ.
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Craig G« Adamson (0024)
Attorney for Defendant
310 South Main, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
VIVIAN M. SCHELLER, et al,

JUDGMENT
Plaintiffs,

:

vs.

:

DIXIE SIX CORPORATION,

:

Defendant.

Civil No. C83-6862
Judge Dean E. Conder

:
oooOooo

This matter came on for trial before the Honorable Dean
E. Conder, a judge of the above-entitled court on the 10th day of
May, 1985, and was concluded on the same day.

Plaintiffs were

represented by Walter P. Faber, their attorney of record.
Defendant was represented by Craig G. Adamson, its attorney of
record.

Trial proceeded and the parties each provided testimony,

submitted documents and made argument to the court in support of
their positions.

Counsel for each of the parties has also

submitted memoranda as requested by the court and the court has
reviewed the memoranda and the file.

The court being fully

advised in the matter has issued its memorandum opinion and has
made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

1
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The court now being fully advised and good cause appearing
therefor,
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

The limited partnership between the parties

continues in force under its specific written terras.
2.

The defendant general partner is ordered to

continue to collect and to distribute the funds from the sale of
the property of the partnership as provided in Article IX of the
agreement of the parties with the first monies applied to payment
to general partner for sums due under paragraph 9.2 and 9.3 of
the agreement of the parties.
3.

Plaintiffs' complaint for declaratory judgment is

4.

Defendant is awarded its costs herein.

denied.

DATED this

/3

day of June, 1985.
BY THE COURT:

Dean?
/eaiy E. Conder
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

day of July, 1985, I

mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment, firstclass mail, postage prepaid, to Walter P. Faber, Attorney for
Plaintiffs, at 2102 East 3300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84109.
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CERTIFICATE OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

if*

OF
D. S. T., LTD.

Pursuant to the Utah Uniform Limited Partnership Act,
Dixie Six Corporation, a Utah corporation, hereinafter referred
to as "Dixie", VIVIAN M. SCHELLER, a woman, and STEVEN D.
TOLLSTRUP, a man, hereinafter referred to collectively as "the
Limited Partners", and individually by name, have formed a
limited partnership and do hereby certify and state:
ARTICLE I
NAME
The name of the limited partnership is D. S. T., LTD.
ARTICLE II
The purpose and character of the business of the
partnership is to subdivide, develop and market certain real
property located in Salt Lake County, Utah.
ARTICLE III
PRINCIPAL PLACE OF BUSINESS
The principal office of the partnership shall be at
4 39 4 South Redwood Road, Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah.
The partnership nay maintain such other offices and places of
business as the partners from time to time find necessary or
desirable, either within or without the State of Utah.
ARTICLE IV
NAMES AND RESIDENCE OF PARTNERS
The names and residence addresses of each member of
the partnership, general and limited partners being specifically
designated, are as follows:
GENERAL PARTNER:
DIXIE SIX CORPORATION

4 39 4 South Redwood Road
Salt Lake C:ty, Utah 84107

LIMITED PARTNERS:
VIVIAN M. SCHELLER

3778 East Cliff Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117

STEVEN D. TOLLSTRUP
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-2ARTICLE V
TERM
The term of the partnership shall begin as of the date
of the execution of this Partnership Agreement, and shall continue
until December 31, 1982, and thereafter from year to year unless
terminated or dissolved as hereinafter provided.
ARTICLE VI
CONTRIBUTIONS BY PARTNERS
The Limited Partners shall sell to the partnership
the real property more fully described in Exhibit "A" annexed
hereto and made a part hereof, which has an agreed value of

^Pft^i

THIRTY THOUSAND DOLLARS ($30,000) per acre.

^

Dixie shall con-

tribute to the partnership the sum of $10,000, which sum shall be
paid to the Limited Partners as a down payment on the property.
In addition thereto, Dixie shall contribute its expertise for the
purpose of subdividing, developing and marketing the property;
shall provide or obtain all equipment, machinery and personnel
necessary for such subdivision, development and marketing; and
shall obtain the necessary and sufficient financing for such
subdivision, development and marketing, using the property as
security therefor.
ARTICLE VII
ADDITIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS
The Limited Partners shall not be obligated to make
any additional contributions to the partnership.
ARTICLE VIII
RETURN OF CONTRIBUTIONS
8.1. The Limited Partners shall be entitled to
payment for the property upon termination of the
partnership as provided in Article V or upon dissolution
of the partnership as provided herein; provided,
however, the Limited Partners shall not receive payment
for the property until (a) all liabilities of the
partnership, except liabilities to the General Partner
and Limited Partners on account of their contributions,
have been paid or there remains property of the partnership sufficient to pay them; (b) the consent of all
partners is had; and (c) the certificate is cancelled
or so amended as to set forth the withdrawal or
reduction.
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-38.2. Subject to the limitations of paragraph 8.1,
the Limited Partners may rightfully demand payment for the
property (a) on dissolution of the partnership, or (b) on
the date specified in Article V for termination and
dissolution of the partnership.
ARTICLE IX
PROFITS AND BOOKS
9.1. The first accounting period for the partnership
shall be from the date of execution of this Agreement to
December 31, 1980. Thereafter, the profits and losses of
the partnership shall be computed annually for each period
January 1 through December 31. Profits and losses shall be
allocated equally as specified hereinbelow.
Receipts of the partnership shall be allocated
;> 9.2.
as follows:
(a) First, to the actual expenses of the
partnership or Dixie relative to the subdividing,
development, improvement and sale of the property,
such expenses to be itemized on a monthly statement
provided to the Limited Partners.
(b) Second, to payment to the Limited Partners
for the real property.
(c) Third, one-half of the remainder to Dixie
and one-half of the r~emalndeV to the Lfmited Partners.
9.3. In calculating the actual expenses of the partnership or Dixie relative to the subdividing, development,
improvement and sale of the property pursuant to paragraph
9.2(a) hereinabove, Dixie shall not apply any fixed cost or
overhead expenses to the partnership project. Dixie or any
of its affiliates or principals may charge__the partnership
a real estate^Hr"o^r"aqe commissi on j o t exceeding" JSI'X" pefce n t
(6%) "or the sales price of the property or any portion

thereof.
9.4. No salary shall be paid to any Partners. There
will be established an individual drawing account to be
maintained for each Partner, which shall be charged with all
withdrawals made for such Partner's benefit. No drawing
account shall be established for the General Partner unless
and until all actual expenses of development and improvement
have been paid and the Limited Partners have received
payment for the real property.
9.5. An individual capital account shall be maintained
for each Partner and shall be credited with all contributions made by that Partner and charged and credited in
accordance with this paragraph and with paragraphs 9.1, 9.6
and 9.7 herein.
9.6. As soon as practicable after the close of each
calendar year, but in no event later than three and one-half
(3-1/2) months after the close of the calendar year, the
drawing accounts of the Partners shall be closed to the
capital accounts.
9.7. After payment of ail debts and expenses of the
partnership, the net cash flow of the partnership may be
distributed to the Partners annually or more frequently,
as determined by the General and Limited Partners. For purposes of this paragraph, net cash flow shall be deemed
to mean net cash remaining in the partnership's account after
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-4payment of ail legitimate partnership expenses and withholding a reasonable reserve for contingencies. Such cash
flow shall be computed without regard to profits or
losses shown on the partnership's books, except as such
profits or losses may affect the reserve for contingencies.
Any such distributions shall be charged against the
Partners' drawing accounts.
9.8. The books of the partnership shall be maintained
at the principal office of the partnership and shall be
open to reasonable inspection by any partner. Such books
shall be kept on such accounting basis as the partnership
nay determine from time to time.
ARTICLE X
ADDITIONAL LIMITED PARTNERS
No addirional limited partners shall be admitted to
the partnership without the unanimous consent of all partners,
both general and limited.

_^^

-/: < (2

^

L'V/3

^Wr^

ARTICLE XII
w/.'A
PRIORITY OF LIMITED PARTNERS
BRS

L'o Li! ited Partner shall have priority over any other
Limited Partner either as to contributions to capita.1 or by way
of income.
ARTICLE XIII
DEMAND OF PROPERTY IN RETURN FOR CONTRIBUTION
Upon termination of the partnership, no general or
limited partner shall have the right to demand and receive property other than cash in return for its contribution.

Upon con-

currence of all the partners, both general and limited, other
than the partner demanding return of his contribution, the
withdrawing partner may have his contribution returned in property
other than cash.
ARTICLE XIV
CONDUCT OF PARTNERSHIP
On the date hereof, the Limited Partners shall convey
the property described in Exhibit "A" to the partnership by
Warranty Deed.

The Limited Partners shall cause such property to

be graded to mee_ Salt Lake County standards, and shall cause all
buildings and personal property located on such property to be
removed r.herefror1.

It is understood by the parties that the

property shall be utilized by the partnership to obtain a loan,
the pioceeds thereof to be used for the subdivision, development
and marketing of t.he property by Dixie.
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-5ARTICLE XV
MANAGEMENT
15.1. Subject to the provisions stated in this
Article, Dixie shall exercise complete control in the
management of the partnership and shall devote such time
zo the partnership as shall be reasonably required for
its welfare and success. Dixie shall obtain the necessary
financing for the subdivision, development and marketing
of the property. ^Dixie shall proceed with subdividing,
developing and marketing the property as expeditiously
as possible. Dixie shall do no act detrimental to the
best interests of the partnership.
15.2. No Limited Partner shall participate in the
management of the partnership business.
15.3. The Limited Partners hereby consent to any sale
or other disposition, encumbrance, mortgage or lease by
Dixie on behalf of the partnership, of any or all of the
partnership assets, now or hereafter acquired, on such terms
and conditions as may be determined by Dixie, and to the
employment, when and if required, of such brokers, agents
and attorneys as Dixie may determine, notwithstanding that
any party hereto may have an interest therein; provided,
however, in the event Dixie proposes to sell the property to
any entity controlled by Dixie or in which Dixie or any of
its principals own an interest, the sale price for the
property shall be determined as follows:
Dixie shall appoint an appraiser, the Limited
Partners shall appoint an appraiser, and the two
appraisers thus appointed shall appoint a third
appraiser. The three appraisers thus determined
shall thereupon appraise the partnership property.
An appraisal agreed to by at least two of the
three appraisers shall be controlling.
ARTICLE XVI
DEPOSITS
All funds of the partnership shall be deposited in its
name in such checking account or accounts designated by Dixie.
All withdrawals therefrom shall be made upon checks signed by the
authorized officers of Dixie.
ARTICLE XVII
CONVEYANCES
Any deed, bill of sale, mortgage, lease, contract of
sale or other document purporting to convey or encumber the interest of the partnership in all or any portion of any real or personal
property at any time held in its name, may be signed by Dixie.
ARTICLE XVIII
DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIP
The partnership shall be dissolved upon the occurrence
of any of

the following events:
(a)

The sale of all property to third parties.
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-6(b) The bankruptcy, insolvency, receivership or
involuntary dissolution of Dixie.
(c) Upon written notice by the Limited Partners, if
Dixie shall fail to perform its obligations hereunder and
such failure shall continue for a period of thirty (30)
days after receipt of such written notice.
In the event of a dissolution as provided hereinabove,
the partnership shall immediately begin to wind up its affairs.
The proceeds front liquidation of partnership assets, after payment
to all creditors of the partnership in the order of priority
provided by law, shall be paid and applied in accordance with
Article IX hereinabove.
ARTICLE XIX
GOVERNING LAW
This agreement and the rights of the parties hereunder
shall be interpreted in accordance with the ]aws in the State of
Utah.
ARTICLE XX
LIMITED LIABILITY
The liability of the Limited Partners shall be limited
to contributions made to the partnership.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have hereunto
set their hands this

3

day of

/ V /4-/g <L H

1980.

GENERAL PARTNER:
DIXIE SIX CORPORATION
ATTEST:
/
>'/

- '"" / A ' ' '

',<* /

By ~""^T

QJP^VU^^^^I
President

LIMITED PARTNERS:

z_
Vivian fl. Scheller
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ST/\TE OF UTAH

)
) ss .
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
On the
appeared before re

3rd

day of

Narch

E. Verne lireeze

, 1980, personally
, who being by me duly

sworn, did say that he is the President of Dixie Six Corporation,
and that the foregoing Certificate of Limited Partnership was
signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of a resolution
of its Board of Directors and said

E. Verne freeze

acknowledged to r.e that said corporation executed the same.

Notary PuBlic
Residing a t :
My Commission
1L July

Salt Lake City

Expires:

1^3

STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
On the

* rd

day of

^arch

, 1980, personally

appeared before ir.e VIVIAN M. SCHELLER and STEVEN D. TOLLSTRUP,
who being by me first duly sworn acknowledged to me that they
executed the forecroing Certificate of Limited Partnership as
limited partners.

Notary Public
Residing a t :
My C o m m i s s i o n
1C J - 2 \

Expires:

l\lt
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MODIFICATION OF CERTIFICATE OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
OF
D.S.T., LTD.
This modification of the Certificate of Limited
Partnership of D.S.T., LTD., made and entered into this
3d

_ d a y of A^QjUa/ukJ

• 198^_f by, between and among

DIXIE SIX CORPORATION, VIVIAN M. SCHELLER and STEVEN D.
TOLLSTRUP, being all of the partners.
W I T N E S S E T H :
WHEREAS, a question as to the termination date
of the partnership exists and the partners have entered into
a verbal agreement to modify the portion of the agreement
concerning termination which they wish to formalize,
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the covenants
and agreements hereinafter contained it is agreed as follows:
1. The Certificate of Limited Partnership is modified as follows:
ARTICLE V
TERM
The term of the partnership shall continue
until June 30, 1983, unless otherwise extended
by tho parties hereto.
DIXIE SIX CORPORATION
BY

' -• , S

Attest:

-^\/-

^

President
•

/

VIVIAN M. SCHELLER

A-23

y

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the 10th day of May, 1991, I
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be mailed,
postage prepaid, to the following:
Walter P. Faber, Jr.
2102 East 3300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109

